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Some reflections on Kleshas – II

In the previous post in this series, I outlined how I began my practice with the five kleśas as presented in the AMOOKOS practice manual, Tantra Magick. Now I want to turn to an examination of how the kleśas are dealt with in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras (YS). Before doing so, however, I want to give a brief introduction to the philosophy that underpins the Yoga Sūtras.

Yoga’s Dualism

Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras is rooted in a dualistic philosophy, drawn from the Sāṅkhya philosophical school – although there are some differences. Sāṅkhya posits two fundamental and ontologically distinct principles – puruṣa – “the witness”, and prakṛti –“material cause” – the world, in which puruṣa is embedded or entangled. Unlike the dualism that we are familiar with from Western philosophy, Sāṅkhya’s dualism is not between the mind and the body. Rather, it is between the puruṣa – pure consciousness (eternal and unchanging), and prakṛti – which includes not only the material world but also the senses and cognitions, emotions, and memory – the processes by which the mind organizes experience. Here, the mind is the cause of ignorance and entanglement with the world; it is the means by which puruṣa misidentifies itself with prakṛti. The goal of Yoga here then, is the disentanglement of puruṣa from prakṛti. Puruṣa is an unchanging eternal, passive “witness”. Everything else is an emergent property of prakṛti. When seen for what it actually is, prakṛti’s influence disappears. But this cannot be an intellectual appreciation, it can only occur through the practice of Yoga.

The nature of mind

According to Sāṅkhya, the mind (and everything else) is formed from the interaction of the three guṇassattva (lucidity), rajas (action), and tamas (inertia). These give rise to individual dispositions. For example, if tamas is dominant in a person, they tend to be slothful, lethargic, sleepy, ignorant, and generally disinclined to act or learn. The constant interaction of the guṇas also brings forth the qualities (tattvas) that manifest the world. The first of these tattvas is buddhi – intelligence. But here, intelligence is not merely cognitive acuity. It also encompasses will, knowledge, discrimination, and judgment. Buddhi is primarily sattvic, but whilst it has the potential to reveal puruṣa, it can also direct consciousness towards the entanglements of the world. Out of buddhi there then emerges the ahaṅkāra (also asmitā); the “I-maker”. This quality produces the self of personhood; the sense of being a self distinct from the world; the ego, in other words. Again, the ahaṅkāra has a dual nature: it can direct consciousness away from the world towards its inmost source – puruṣa. It can also continuously misidentify selfhood with the diversions of the world. From the churning of the guṇas with the ahaṅkāra emerges manas (mind). This quality serves to organize the senses. It synthesizes and categorizes. It is also the seat of emotions, attachments, and aversions. In the YS, buddhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas are all subsumed into a single category – citta.

Also from the ahaṅkāra there emerge the tanmātras – the essences or powers that are the root of the five senses (taste, touch, sound, sight, smell). These, in their turn, give rise to the mahābhūtas – the five gross elements (fire, water, earth, air, and space); and the the five karmendriyas; the action-powers of speaking, grasping, walking, excreting and generating. It is with these powers that manas is able to gratify the desires which arise out of the ahaṅkāra.

An analogy I’ve come up with to illustrate this process is the kid in the Sweetshop. A kid goes into a sweetshop for the first time – this is the conjunction of puruṣa with prakṛti. Before him is arrayed a dazzling splendor – one of those WOW! moments. The dazzling splendor of the sweetshop is made up of things. “There’s that! And that! And oh, look, that!” This is the activity of buddhi – the discriminating facility. The kid “realizes” that all those things are different – and separate from him (i.e. not self). It’s at this point that the ahaṅkāra comes into play as the kid thinks “I want that! And I want that! And that!” Simultaneously, the mind – manas – draws the kid’s attention to the (perceived) external world through the capacity to make sensory distinctions (smells, sights, tastes, etc.) and the capacities for action (speech, grasping, etc.)

It is through the interaction of the sense-capacity and the objective sense that gives rise to knowledge of that sense. When an object excites the senses, manas arranges the sense impressions, the ahaṅkāra makes it self-referential, and the buddhi forms the concept. The ahaṅkāra makes claim to the objects of the world, identifying with the desired objects and rejecting the undesirable ones, so leading to the pursuit of that which is desired and the avoidance of that which is rejected – thus leading to pleasure and pain. This is a natural process, but, according to Sāṅkhya, it is because of the predominance of tamas (inertia) and rajas (activity) and the intense attachment to the objects of the world, that the ahaṅkāra loses its capacity for “right discrimination”. The answer, therefore, is to examine one’s thought processes in order to develop the proper attitudes towards the objects of the senses – in order to extricate oneself from the constant agitations of the mental complex (desire, anger, disappointment, attachment, etc.).

YS v1.2 states the goal of Yoga:

yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ
Yoga is the stilling of the changing states of mind.

According to the YS, the mind is never still. It constantly produces vṛttis (cognitions) that constantly turn the attention of puruṣa towards prakṛti – maintaining the puruṣa’s entanglement in saṁsāra. As Vyāsa famously puts it – “the river called mind flows in two directions.” Vṛttis are likened to the waves of a sea. The mind can either flow towards discrimination or salvation or remain entangled in worldly existence – saṁsāra. The default state of humanity is thus one of avidyā – ignorance, wherein consciousness is misidentified with the ever-changing flow of mental impressions, thoughts, feelings, memories, and the experiences of the body (all elements of prakṛti). The kleśās play an important role in maintaining this misidentification, as they are particular kinds of vṛttis.

How are the kleśās dealt with in the YS?

The kleśās are first alluded to in verse I.5 of the YS:

vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ
There are five kinds of changing states of the mind, and they are either detrimental or nondetrimental [to the practice of yoga].

Kliṣṭa – detrimental – shares the same root as kleśa; kliś, to disturb or torment. The vṛttis, according to this verse, may be conducive or detrimental to practice. The detrimental vṛttis are the five kleśas (afflictions, obstacles): avidyā (ignorance), asmitā (ego), rāga (attachment), dveṣa (aversion), and abhiniveśāḥ (clinging to life). The kleśas act to obscure the puruṣa, and they can only be removed by the practice of kriyā-yoga.

Patañjali expands upon the nature of the kleśas in a series of verses in the second part of the YS.

avidyāsmitā-rāga-dveṣabhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ
The impediments [to samādhi] are nescience, ego, desire, aversion, and clinging to life.”
YS. II.3

This verse states what the five kleśas are – and the order is important.

avidyā kṣetram uttareṣām prasupta-tanu-vicchinnodārāṇām

Ignorance is the breeding ground of the other kleśas, whether they are in a dormant, weak, intermittent, or fully activated state. II.4
The root cause of the kleśas is Ignorance (avidyā). It is the field out of which the other four emerge. As long as ignorance is present, it sustains the others. If ignorance is dispelled, the other four disappear. Kleśas may be dormant – waiting like seeds to grow. They may be weak (tanu) as in the case when the practitioner cultivates their opposites. They may be intermittent – when one kleśa dominates, others may not be present. If Attachment is dominant, then Aversion will be latent – the two are not experienced simultaneously – hence they are intermittent. When they are fully activated, the kleśas are exerting their full influence on the mind.

anityāśuci-duḥkhānātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā
Ignorance is the notion that takes the self, which is joyful, pure, and eternal, to be the non-self, which is painful, unclean, and temporary. II.5

Ignorance is the primary cause of bondage. It is not merely ordinary ignorance but a category error – a fundamental mistake of identification with the body (that is painful, weak, temporary) as opposed to the puruṣa – self (eternal, unchanging, inactive). This is the condition of the ordinary person. From this verse it is fairly obvious that Patañjali does not consider the body to be a suitable vehicle for liberation; rather, it is an obstacle. I’ll come back to that point later and in the next post. Ignorance is not merely a mistaken identification that can pass away or be overcome. It is the fundamental ground of being that non-yogis are bound by. Later verses explain how avidyā is related to karma and saṁsāra.

dṛg-darśana-śaktyor ekātmatevāsmitā

Ego is [to consider] the nature of the seer and the nature of the instrumental power of seeing to be the same thing. II.6
The next kleśa to be considered is ego – “I am-ness”. Here, the “seer” is the puruṣa. The “instrumental power of seeing” refers to buddhi. Just as ignorance is the field from which grow the other four kleśas, so too, ego is the field from which grow the remaining three. These cannot be diminished or weakened without subduing āsmitā-kleśa.

sukhānuśayī rāgaḥ
Attachment stems from [experiences] of happiness. II.7

duḥkhānuśayī dveṣaḥ
Aversion stems from [experiences] of pain. II.8

The experience of both Attachment and Aversion is linked to memory, as explained by the commentaries on the YS. The person who seeks happiness or pleasure has done so in the past and seeks to repeat it. This constitutes Attachment. Similarly, Aversion – the feelings of resistance to pain (for example) are rooted in the memory of past experiences of pain. This is explained in YS 1.11:

anubhūta-viṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ
Memory is the retention of [images of] sense objects that have been experienced.

Everything that a person has experienced generates a saṁskāra – an imprint or impression in the citta (mind). They are not merely passive impressions though, as they accumulate they cluster together, and are the root cause of habits, personality traits, behaviors, and addictions. Drinking coffee, for example, generates a saṁskāra, and impels the person to repeat the experience – generating more saṁskāras that strengthen their power to impel the person to drink more coffee. Saṁskāras are sometimes likened to weeds – they lie latent in the mind and can be carried over from previous lives.

Both Attachment and Aversion depend from the Ego.

svarasa-vāhī viduṣo ‘pi tathārūḍho ‘bhiniveśaḥ
[The tendency of] clinging to life affects even the wise; it is an inherent tendency. II.9

Clinging to life is generally taken by the commentators on YS as a synonym for the fear of death.

The commentaries of Śaṅkara and Miśra both highlight this verse as proof of previous lives – the experience of death being a powerful latent impression from previous experiences of death. Vijñānabhikṣu however, points out that fear of death may simply depend on the fact that a person sees death all around them and can easily infer that they too will die. Verses II.10-II.14 continue Patañjali’s exposition of the kleśas – covering how they are eliminated, and their relationship to karma and saṃsāra. I shall leave those for another time.

Some observations

Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras 1 has been dated to between 300-400 CE. It reflects the dominant philosophy of the period, inherited from Brāhmaṇic thought and the Buddhist and Jain śramaṇas that the world is a place of suffering caused by activity, and beings subject to karma are trapped in the endless cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra). Several scholars have pointed towards the Buddhist influences in the philosophy of the YS, and the kleśas are a prime example of Buddhist concepts being reworked into the YS. The remedy for this suffering, in the YS, is to puruṣa to the full realization of its own pure consciousness, thus avoiding future suffering and getting off the wheel of saṃsāra. This is achieved through the meditative absorption of samādhi. Again, there are similar perspectives in Buddhist thought.

As can be seen from the above, the kleśas are a key component of the YS’s epistemology and soteriological project. They emerge in a precise order – avidyā being their prime root – and are inextricably entwined with the YS theory of mind. This is very different from the presentation of the kleśas as essentially self-reflexivity practices that I encountered in the AMOOKOS teachings (see previous post). That is not to say that such a practice has no utility – I’d say that cultivating a capacity for self-reflexivity is very necessary for practitioners, but according to the YS, the kleśas can only be removed through sustained Yoga practice. Simply reflecting on one’s likes, dislikes, self-perceptions and habits is not enough.

My question for the next post is “Are the kleśas found in the tantric traditions?”

Sources
The translations of the YS in this post are from Edwin Bryant’s Yoga Sūtras (YS) of Patañjali: A New Edition, Translation, and Commentary, with Insights from the Traditional Commentators. North Point Press, 2009. Well worth a close study. Also, I’d recommend Karen O’Brien-Kop’s The Philosophy of the Yogasutra. Bloomsbury Academic, 2023 and Philip A. Mass, “A Concise Historiography of Classical Yoga Philosophy” in Eli Franco (ed.): Historiography and Periodization of Indian Philosophy (De Nobili Series, Vienna 2013)

Notes:

  1. now known as the Pātañjalayogaśāstra